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Abstract: This paper describes our experience in using coordinated atomic (CA)
actions as a system structuring tool to design and validate a sophisticated control
system for a complex industrial application that has high reliability and safety
requirements. Our study is based on an extended production cell model, the
specification and simulator for which were defined and developed by FZI
(Forschungszentrum Informatik, Germany). This “Fault-Tolerant Production Cell”
represents a manufacturing process involving redundant mechanical devices
(provided in order to allow continued production in the presence of machine faults).
The challenge posed by the model specification is to design a control system that
maintains specified safety and liveness properties even in the presence of a large
number and variety of device and sensor failures. Based on an analysis of possible
such failures, we provide in this paper details of: i) a design for a control program
that uses CA actions to deal with both safety-related and fault tolerance concerns,
and ii) the formal verification of this design based on the use of model-checking.
We found that CA action structuring facilitated both the design and verification tasks
by enabling the various safety problems (involving possible clashes of moving
machinery) to be treated independently. Even complex situations involving the
concurrent occurrence of any pairs of the many possible mechanical and sensor
failures can be handled simply yet appropriately. The formal verification activity
was performed in parallel with the design activity and the interaction between them
resulted in a combined exercise in “design for validation”; formal verification was
very valuable in identifying some very subtle residual bugs in early versions of our
design which would have been difficult to detect otherwise.
Key Words — Concurrency, coordinated atomic (CA) actions, exception
handling, object orientation, formal verification, model checking, reactive systems,
reliability and safety.
1 Introduction
The goal of this work is to investigate a rigorous approach to the development of safety-critical
applications, in particular to examine the feasibility of using coordinated atomic (CA) actions
[Xu et al. 1995] as a structuring tool to design a fault-tolerant control program for a
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realistically-detailed model of an industrial production cell that contains some redundant devices
and sensors, and then to use model-checking to debug, improve, and verify the design
formally.
An industrial production cell model, based on a metal-processing plant in Karlsruhe, Germany,
was first created by the FZI in 1993 [Lewerentz & Lindner 1995], within the German Korso
Project, in order to evaluate and compare different formal methods and to explore their
practicability for industrial applications. Since then, this original case study, Production Cell I,
has attracted wide attention and has been investigated by over 35 different research groups. In
1996, the FZI presented the specification of an extended version of the original production cell,
called the “Fault-Tolerant Production Cell” or Production Cell II [Lötzbeyer 1996]. This second
model, which has an additional press, extra sensors, and warning light systems to facilitate
fault detection and fault tolerance, is much more complex and realistic than Production Cell I.
Unlike the first model, failures of electro-mechanical components and sensors in Production
Cell II are of major concern. In particular, the cell is intended to be used to provide continued
service even if one of the two presses is out of order. However, to the best of our knowledge,
very little work has been done on Production Cell II, especially regarding the development and
formal treatment of different control programs.
The original, rather simplistic, production cell model assumes no device or sensor failures
occur. Under such assumptions, we used the CA action concept to organize and design a
control program, and implemented it in Java [Zorzo et al. 1998]. The control program that we
developed was then applied to a FZI-provided Tcl/Tk simulator, demonstrating how functional
and safety-related requirements can be satisfied separately by controlled multi-threaded
cooperation and the strict enclosure of all interactions between cooperating devices within CA
actions.
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell exposes more and richer issues related to failures and fault
tolerance, and it is therefore a valuable case study for investigating and developing concurrent
fault-tolerant software. Because devices, sensors and actuators can fail, the required control
program is necessarily much more complex than the program that we developed for the
original, non-fault-tolerant production cell.
This paper is organized as follows. Following a brief description of the CA action concept and
the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell model, Section 3 presents an analysis of the possible failures
of the various devices and sensors as defined by FZI. Section 4 describes a design of a control
program that uses CA actions both as a basic structuring tool and as a unified framework for
handling exceptional situations. Sections 5, 6 and 7 study the formal treatment of CA action-
based designs, formalize important properties of Production Cell II, and examine those
properties by model-checking. Sections 8 and 9 discuss an implementation of the control
program and then conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries: CA Actions and Production Cell II
Distributed computing often gives rise to complex concurrent and interacting activities. An
effective supporting mechanism is required for controlling and co-ordinating such activities.
Also, due in no small measure to their complexity, concurrent and distributed systems are very
prone to faults and errors. Various fault tolerance techniques for coping with hardware and
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software faults can provide a practical way of improving the dependability of such systems.
These typically use fault masking or backward error recovery. However, because faults can
have an impact on, or arise from, the environment of a computing system [Campbell & Randell
1986], some forms of error recovery may require stepping outside the boundaries of a
computer system (i.e. considering the computer system and its environment recursively as an
entire distributed system at a higher level of abstraction), in which case backward error
recovery by the computer system will normally not suffice, and fault masking is infeasible.
In current practice, however, the majority of fault-tolerant computing systems do not attempt to
tolerate software faults, or to facilitate provision of means of recovering from errors that affect
both the computer system and its environment — rather they concentrate on the problems that
arise from operational faults (typically hardware faults). For example, many software systems
that use the concept of atomic (trans)actions to construct fault-tolerant distributed applications
generally assume that erroneous outputs can be detected before transaction commitment occurs,
and that user programs are correct. The CA action scheme is motivated by the need to deal with
the more general and complicated fault situations that occur in many real-world applications.
2 .1 Co-ordinated Atomic Actions: Overview and Example
A CA action is a mechanism for co-ordinating multi-threaded interactions and ensuring
consistent access to objects in the presence of concurrency and potential faults. CA actions can
be regarded as providing a programming discipline for nested multi-threaded transactions
[Caughey et al. 1998] that in addition provides very general exception handling provisions.
They augment any fault tolerance that is provided by the underlying transaction system by
providing means for dealing with i) unmasked hardware and software faults that have been
reported to the application level to deal with, and/or ii) application-level failure situations that
have to be responded to. (In fact CA actions also provide a convenient structuring mechanism
for using software fault tolerance by means of software design diversity at the application level,
but this use of them is not considered further in this paper.)
The concurrent execution threads participating in a given CA action enter and leave the action
synchronously. Within the CA action, operations on objects can be performed co-operatively
by roles executing in parallel. To cooperate in a CA action a group of concurrent threads must
come together and agree to perform each role of the action, with each thread undertaking a
different role. Inside a CA action, some or of all its roles can be involved in further (nested) CA
actions. If an error is detected inside a CA action, appropriate forward and/or backward
recovery measures must be invoked co-operatively, by all the roles, in order to reach some
mutually consistent conclusion. To support backward error recovery, a CA action must provide
a recovery line that coordinates the recovery points of the objects and threads participating in
the action so as to avoid the domino effect [Randell 1975]. To support forward error recovery,
a CA action must provide an effective means of co-ordinating the use of exception handlers. An
acceptance test can and ideally should be provided in order to determine whether the outcome of
the CA action is successful. Error recovery for participating threads of a CA action generally
requires the use of explicit error coordination mechanisms, i.e. exception handling or backward
error recovery within the CA action; objects that are external to the CA action and so can be
shared with other actions and threads must provide their own error coordination mechanisms.
These external objects, which are in effect being competed for, must behave atomically with
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respect to other CA actions and threads so that they cannot be used as an implicit means of
“smuggling” information [Kim 1982] into or out of a CA action.
Figure 1 shows an example in which two concurrent threads enter a CA action in order to play
the corresponding roles. Within the CA action the two concurrent roles communicate with each
other and manipulate the external objects co-operatively in pursuit of some common goal.
However, during the execution of the CA action, an exception e is raised by one of the roles.
The other role is then informed of the exception and both roles transfer control to their
respective exception handlers H1 and H2 for this particular exception, which then attempt to
perform forward error recovery. (When multiple exceptions are raised within an action, a
resolution algorithm based on an exception resolution graph [Campbell & Randell 1986][Xu et
al. 1998a] is used to identify the appropriate exception, and hence the set of exception handlers
to be used.) The effects of erroneous operations on external objects are repaired, if possible, by
putting the objects into new correct states so that the CA action is able to exit with an acceptable
outcome. The two threads leave the CA action synchronously at the end of the action. (As an
alternative to performing forward error recovery, the two participating threads could undo the
effects of operations on the external objects, roll back and then try again. This would in general
require the use of diversely-designed software alternates if the aim was to tolerate residual
design faults, though a simple “re-try” strategy can be effective when the fault is in effect
transient [Gray 1990].)
Thread  1
Thread 2
Time
CA action
e
raised exception e
exception handler H1
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow
cooperation 
between roles
return to normal
exit with success
accesses repairs
exception handler H2
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow return to normal
External Objects
start transaction commit transaction
role 1
role 2
Fig. 1: Example of a CA Action
In general, the desired effect of performing a CA action is specified by an acceptance test. The
effect only becomes visible if the test is passed. The acceptance test allows both a normal
outcome and one or more exceptional (or degraded) outcomes, with each exceptional outcome
signalling a specified exception to the surrounding environment. The CA action is considered to
have failed if the action failed to pass the test, or roles of the action failed to agree about the
outcome. In this case, it is necessary to try to undo the potentially visible effects of the CA
action and signal an abort exception to the surrounding environment. If the CA action is
unable to satisfy the “all-or-nothing” property (e.g. because the undo fails), then a failure
exception must be signalled to the surrounding environment (in general an enclosing CA
Action). This failure exception indicates that the CA action has not passed its acceptance test
and its effects have not been undone, so that the system has probably been left in an erroneous
state, which it is now the responsibility of the environment to deal with. Thus, ideally,
execution of a CA action will only produce one of the following four forms of outputs: a
normal outcome, an exceptional outcome, an abort exception, or a failure exception.
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2 .2 The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell consists of six devices: two conveyor belts (a feed belt and
a deposit belt), an elevating rotary table, two presses and a rotary robot that has two orthogonal
extendible arms equipped with electromagnets (see Figure 2). These devices are associated with
a set of sensors that provide useful information to a controller, and a set of actuators via which
the controller can exercise control over the whole system. The task of the cell is to get a metal
blank from its “environment” via the feed belt, transform it into a forged plate by using a press,
and then return it to the environment via the deposit belt. More precisely, the production cycle
for each blank is: i) if the traffic light for insertion shows green, a blank may be added, e.g. by
the blank supplier, to the feed belt from the environment, ii) the feed belt conveys the blank to
the table, iii) the table rotates and rises to the position where the magnets of the robot are able to
grip the blank, iv) arm 1 of the robot picks the blank up and places it into an unoccupied press,
either press 1 or press 2, v) the chosen press forges the blank, vi) arm 2 of the robot removes
the forged plate from the press and places it on the deposit belt, and vii) if the traffic light for
deposit is green, the plate may be forwarded further and carried to the environment where a
container may be used, e.g. by the blank consumer, to store the forged pieces. (Normally both
presses are used and a certain amount of interleaving of two such production cycles, one for
each press, is possible.)
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Fig. 2: The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell (Top View)
Note that the controller can be implemented in hardware, and/or software. In the following we
will investigate a software-implemented controller only. Our design and control program will
support a varying, adaptive operating sequence of robot actions in order to achieve high
flexibility.
Basic System Requirements
A correct control program must satisfy certain requirements specified by the Production Cell II
model, namely:
Safety: i) device mobility must be restricted, ii) device collisions must be prevented, iii)
blanks must not be dropped outside safe areas (i.e. feed belt, table, press, and deposit
belt,) and iv) sufficient distance must be maintained between blanks.
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Liveness: Any blank put into the cell via the feed belt must eventually leave the cell via
the deposit belt and must have been forged by one of the presses. In addition, this
property must still hold if one of the two presses fails.
Failure Detection and Continuous Service: When any of a large number of defined
failures occurs, it must be detected and unless it just concerns one of the presses the
system must be stopped in a safe state. After recovery from the failure, which typically
would require action by the user of the production cell, the system should be able to
resume operations starting from this safe state. Similarly, after a failed press has been
repaired, it should be able to resume its contributions to the production process.
(Certain safety requirements can no longer be met if some special failures occur, e.g. a
blank is dropped outside safe areas, but other safety properties must still be guaranteed,
e.g. restricted device mobility.)
Other requirements such as flexibility and efficiency may be taken into account, but must not
conflict with the above requirements.
System Clock, Stop Watches and Alarm Signals
The Production Cell II model provides a global system clock that gives the current time at any
instant. Based on this system clock, a control program can implement several stop watches
supervising individual processes, e.g. the movement of the feed belt. The Production Cell II
model also provides an alarm signal mechanism for reporting component failures to the user of
the production cell. The control program is required to switch on the alarm signal whenever a
failure is detected — it is switched off by the operator when the failed device has been repaired.
3 Failure Definitions and Analysis
Before defining and analyzing various possible failures, we state the major assumptions made
in the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell model, as defined by FZI:
Assumption 1: The system clock, two traffic lights, and the alarm signal mechanism are
fault-free and do not fail.
Assumption 2: Values of sensors, actuators and clocks are always transmitted correctly
without any loss or error.
Assumption 3: No failure can cause devices to exceed certain limiting positions; in the
worst case devices are stopped automatically.
Assumption 4: All sensor failures are indicated by sensor values. Boolean sensors
return a zero value, and enumeration type sensors return a specified value that
represents a failure.
Assumption 5: All actuator failures will cause devices to stop.
Now we can define and analyze various failures with respect to each of the six devices in the
cell. For a given device, we classify possible failures into: i) sensor failures, ii) actuator
failures, and iii) lost or stuck blanks. We also show how a given failure can be detected by
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sensors, actuators, stopwatches, singly or in combination. It is important to note that in many
cases certain different types of failure cannot be distinguished using just the on-line information
available. We therefore discuss failure detection only, and assume that fault diagnosis and
subsequent device repair are performed off-line. Due to limitations of space, our discussion just
treats the case of a single failure of either the robot or a press; for a complete treatment, see [Xu
et al. 1998b].
3 .1 Failures of the Robot
Sensor Failures: There are three sensors associated with the robot — each sensor returns one of
several pre-defined values about the position of one of the robot’s arms or the robot’s rotary
position. Three electric motors are responsible for rotating the robot or extending/retracting its
arms. Sensor failure or electric motor failure are indicated automatically by a special sensor
value, but these two types of failure cannot be distinguished using this value alone.
Actuator Failures: There are three kinds of actuator associated with the robot and each has its
own failure modes: i) failure modes of actuators that retract an arm of the robot include: no
response (i.e. cannot move) and unexpected stopping of a moving arm, which can be detected
by checking values of robot sensors, ii) failure modes of actuators that switch an arm magnet
on or off include: no response (e.g. the arm cannot pick up or cannot drop a blank) and
unexpected picking or dropping, which can be detected only by checking values of other
devices interacting with the robot, and iii) failure modes of the actuator that rotates the robot,
that include: no response (i.e. cannot rotate) and unexpected stopping of the rotating robot,
which can be detected immediately by checking values of the sensor that indicates the robot’s
rotary positions.
Lost Blank: This type of failure can be detected only by checking a group of sensor values from
various devices interacting with the robot.
3 .2 Failures of a Press
Sensor Failures: There are four sensors associated with each press, one reporting whether a
blank is in the press (called blank sensor), and others reporting press positions. A failure of the
blank sensor can be detected by checking whether a robot arm has transferred a blank to or
from the press. The failure of a sensor that reports press positions can be detected by using a
stop watch to measure the moving time of the press and by checking other sensor values on
press positions.
Actuator Failures: Failure modes for the actuators that move the lower part of a press include:
no response (i.e. cannot move), and a moving press unexpected stopping, which can be
detected by checking values of the press position sensors and values of stop watches.
Stuck or Lost Blank: This failure can be detected only by checking the value of the sensor that
reports whether a blank is in a press.
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3 .3 Failure Detection Measures
In order to detect various failures of sensors and actuators as well as lost blanks, appropriate
detection measures must be incorporated into the control software. Assertion statements are a
common form of failure detection measure. For example, after the control program has sent a
control command to the robot and asked the robot to drop a blank into press 1, the value of the
sensor that reports a blank in the press must be checked by an assertion statement. If the sensor
returns 0, indicating that no blank is in press 1, then an appropriate exception must be raised.
There are several possibilities that could have caused this exception: i) the blank might have
been lost, ii) arm 1 of the robot might have failed to drop the blank, and iii) the sensor of press
1 might have failed to report that the blank has been dropped into the press. If a powerful on-
line diagnosis algorithm could identify this failure as the sensor failure, exception handling and
error recovery would be quite straightforward — just report the exception to the user and
continue normal operations of the cell. However, our analysis shows that distinguishing these
failures from each other at run-time is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In most cases, if a
failure occurs and thus an exception is raised, the cell will simply have to be stopped in a safe
state, if at all possible, for the user to deal with. (Certain safety requirements cannot be met if a
blank is dropped outside the safe areas, but the others must still be maintained.)
Failures of sensors that report press positions and failures of the press actuator can be detected
by assertion statements and identified unambiguously with the aid of stopwatches. Such
failures must be reported to the user through the alarm. However, because the Fault-Tolerant
Production Cell has two presses, normal operations can be maintained using a single press,
albeit with some performance degradation.
A fault-tolerant program should have the ability to confine damage and failures. For the
production cycle of the cell, a device or sensor failure should not affect normal operations of
other devices. For example, when a failure of the robot occurs and is handled by the control
program, the deposit belt should still deliver an already forged blank, if there is one, to the
blank consumer. In the following, we will demonstrate how CA actions can confine damage
and failures effectively, and minimize the impact of component failures on the entire cell.
4 Design of a Control Program Using CA Actions
The main characteristics of our design are the way it separates safety, functionality, and
efficiency concerns among a set of CA actions, which thus can be designed, and validated,
independently of each other, and of the set of device/sensor-controllers that dynamically
determine the order in which the CA actions are executed at run-time. In particular, the safety
requirements are satisfied at the level of CA actions, while the other requirements are met by the
device/sensor-controllers. There is a detailed discussion in [Zorzo et al. 1998] as to how these
design decision were made and why we used certain actions to enclose the interaction between
certain devices in our control program for Production Cell I. Our design for Production Cell II
follows a similar strategy. It includes 12 main CA actions; each action controls one step of the
blank processing and typically involves passing a blank between two devices. Any device can
move only within a CA action. (An action can contain further nested actions — see Figure 4 for
an example.)
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There are six concurrent execution threads in the control program, corresponding to the six
devices: FeedBelt, Table, Robot, Press1, Press2, and DepositBelt, each of which
threads basically performs a simple endless loop. (Details of the controllers are given in section
4.4.)  All device movements are performed within CA actions, and the devices involved in each
action are switched off before the action is left, so that when not under the control of an action
each device is stationary. Two additional threads model activities in the environment:
BlankSupplier, and BlankConsumer. Note that FeedBelt is responsible for controlling the
traffic light that indicates when another blank can be inserted, while BlankConsumer is
responsible for controlling the light that indicates when a processed blank can be deposited. A
blank is designed as an external object with respect to the top-level CA actions. Usually, one
role of a CA action takes the blank as an input argument, and the device corresponding to this
role passes it to another role which returns it as an output argument. Figure 3 portrays the 12
related CA actions as overlays on the FZI simulator diagram [Lötzbeyer 1996].
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LoadFeedBelt
LoadTable
UnloadDepositBelt
TransportBlank LoadDepositBelt
ForgeBlank1
ForgeBlank2
UnloadTable
UnloadPress2
LoadPress2
LoadPress1
UnloadPress1
blank
blank
table arm 1
arm 2 
feed belt
deposit belt
robot
press 1
press 2
Fig. 3: CA Actions That Control Production Cell II
Note that an intersection between CA actions in Figure 3, e.g. between TransportBlank and
LoadDepositBelt, represents the fact that those CA actions cannot be executed in parallel. The
mutual exclusion feature of CA actions guarantees that a blank or a device cannot be involved in
more than one action at a time so that neither blanks nor devices can collide. Furthermore, even
if the actions that devices participate in are invoked in the wrong order, because of a control
program design fault, then the result will be at worst a safe deadlock.
As mentioned previously, each hardware device is associated with a device-controller (i.e. an
execution thread) which is responsible for dynamically specifying the sequence of actions that
the device will participate in. For example, without compromising safety and functionality
requirements, the robot thread can skip all the CA actions related to one of the presses if this
press has failed, and so tolerate this fault.
4 .1 Design of CA Actions
Our design assumes that an action will begin only if its pre-conditions are valid, and that if no
exception is raised during the execution of an action then its post-conditions will hold (though
this could, if so wished, be checked using an acceptance test). In this Section, we first address
the normal pre- and post-conditions for actions that control the entire cell. For a given action,
these conditions are used to ensure that the execution of that action will not violate in any way
10
10
the system requirements given in Section 3, especially those related to safety and fault
tolerance. Due to limitations of space, we take just the action LoadPress1 as an example.
CA action LoadPress1
pre-conditions post-conditions
robot off robot off
blank on arm 1 no blank on arm 1
both arms retracted both arms retracted
robot at one of the defined angles robot angle: arm 1 towards press 1
press 1 off press 1 off
no blank in press 1 blank in press 1
press 1 in bottom position press 1 in middle position
Values of the related sensors or states of the related actuators that can be used to check these
conditions are identified in our detailed design to facilitate the actual implementation of a control
program (see [Xu et al. 1998b]). For example, to check whether the robot is off, we can check
that all three related actuators are in the stop state. To make sure that arm 1 and arm 2 are
retracted (a safe state), we can check values from the sensors that report arm positions.
The robot has six defined rotary positions or angles so the robot-related CA actions could
specify a defined angle as one of their pre-conditions. But this would affect the flexibility of the
robot and limit the possible execution sequences of CA actions. The weaker pre-condition
“robot at one of the defined angles” permits more possible execution sequences, thereby
improving system performance.
We will now show how CA actions can deal with various types of failures in a well-controlled
manner by specifying the exceptional post-conditions for a given action. Consider the action
LoadPress1 again. Figure 4 illustrates the interactions (themselves involving nested CA
actions) between the participating threads within the LoadPress1 action. This action has four
roles: Robot, Press1, RobotSensor, and Press1Sensor, and represents the co-operation that
arranges for arm 1 of the robot to drop a blank into press 1.
concurrent threads CA act on LoadPress1
RobotSensor
Robot(Arm1)
Press1Sensor
Press1
External
object
Blank
move press 1
to the middle
position
extend arm 1
retract
arm 1
access
rotate robot
synchronizing drop blank
Fig. 4: CA Action LoadPress1
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Action LoadPress1 is described below using the COALA notation, which was developed for
the formal specification of CA actions [Vachon et al. 1998]. Our Java implementation of the
control program is based on a set of pre-defined templates for CA actions that can be used to
implement CA action designs specified in COALA.
CAA LoadPress1;
Interface
  Use
MetalBlank;
  Roles
Robot: blankType, robotActuator;
Press1: blankType, press1Actuator;
RobotSensor: arm1ExtensionSensor, robotAngleSensor;
Press1Sensor: blankSensor, lowPositionSensor, midPositionSensor;
  Exceptions
Press1Failure, Arm1Failure1, ...;      ;;exceptions to signal
Body
  Use CAA                                ;;specify nested actions
RotateRobot, MovePress1toMiddle, ExtendArm1, RetractArm1;
  Object
robotPress1Channel: Channel;  ;;shared local objects
  Exceptions
press1_failure, blank_sensor_failure, ...;  ;;internal exceptions
  Handlers
press1_handler, blank_sensor_handler, ...;
  Resolution
press1_failure -> press1_handler, ...; ;;exception resolution graph
  Role Robot(...);
  Role Press1(...);
  ...
End LoadPress1;
The exceptions declared in the Interface part of an action are those that can be signalled to
the enclosing action. The roles of an action can signal an exception directly but must guarantee
that the exception that is signalled has been agreed by all the roles of that action. In the case of
abortion or failure, the CA action support mechanism (which can be assumed by the application
programmer to be fault-free) will enforce the abortion and signal the appropriate exception,
either abort or failure, to the enclosing action. Exceptions declared within the Body of a CA
action can be raised by roles. When multiple exceptions are raised within an action, the CA
action support mechanism controls the execution of a resolution algorithm based on an
exception resolution graph declared in the Resolution part. After a resolving exception is
identified, the corresponding handler declared in the Handlers part will be invoked (see
Section 4.3).
An exception handler will attempt to bring the system back to normal. If it is successful, the CA
action will end with a normal outcome. However, in most situations the handler can only
provide some degraded service, i.e. an exceptional outcome, and must signal the corresponding
exception. Again, in the case of abortion or failure, the CA action support mechanism will take
control. If a further exception is raised during the execution of an exception handler, control is
transferred to the CA action support mechanism immediately and the action must either abort or
signal a failure exception.
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4 .2 Dealing with Component Failures
We first investigate situations involving single faults, i.e. we assume that only one component
failure can occur before the system is brought  if necessary to a safe stop, and the component is
repaired. During the execution of a CA action, if a failure (of a component involved in this CA
action) occurs and is detected by an assertion statement or an acceptance test, a corresponding
exception will be raised within the action by one of its roles. The exception is propagated
immediately to the other roles of the action and all roles then transfer control to their exception
handlers for this exception so that they can attempt to perform appropriate error recovery. In
most cases when a component failure takes place in the cell, it is not possible to recover
completely from the error and the normal post-conditions of the action can no longer be
satisfied. Thus, exceptional post-conditions with respect to various given failures must be
defined to specify the exceptional outcomes of an action.
By way of example, we outline the basic requirements for the handlers of two different
exceptions:
Handler for the Press 1 Failure: The LoadPress1 action performs forward error
recovery by moving the robot to an appropriate position so that it will be able to put the
unforged blank, which is still on arm 1, into press 2 once the press is available.
Handler for the Rotary Sensor or Motor Failure: (In this case, action LoadPress1 fails
to rotate the robot to the intended position.) The action will simply use backward error
recovery to attempt to move the robot back to its initial position and rotate it again. If the
failure persists, the action will produce an exceptional outcome as defined below.
For the LoadPress1 action, we identify seven exceptional outcomes and corresponding
exceptional post-conditions (see [Xu et al. 1998b]). By way of example, the following table
illustrates the exceptional outcome when press 1 fails. It is important to notice that different
exceptional outcomes may lead to different states of the production cell. For example, the
exceptional outcome caused by just a press 1 failure corresponds to the situation where the
production cell continues with only one operational press. On the other hand, since the blank
sensor is a redundant component of the cell, if both presses are still operational its failure
merely requires a report to be made to the user of the cell. However, the other five outcomes
will have to stop the entire cell in a safe state.
exception to signal exceptional post-conditions
robot off
blank on arm 1
press 1 failure both arms retracted
robot angle: arm 1 towards press 2
press 1 off
no blank in press 1
By means of such analyses, given the way in which CA actions enable the different failure
situations to be treated independently of each other, the design of the actual set of handlers for
the various exceptional outcomes of each of the 12 top-level CA actions becomes rather
straightforward - full details can be found in  [Xu et al. 1998b].
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4 .3 Dealing with Concurrent Failures
Now let us address the problem of possible concurrent failures. In the interests of simplicity,
we assume that only two failures may occur within the same time interval before the system is
stopped and the related components repaired. Some concurrent failures can be covered
implicitly by the corresponding single failure situation. Others may need different handling and
require separate post conditions. The following table shows post-conditions for an example
pair of concurrent failures:
exception to signal exceptional post-conditions
robot off
(rotary sensor or motor failure) & blank on arm 1
 press 1 failure both arms retracted
press 1 off
no blank in press 1
The failure of the robot’s rotary sensor or motor can be detected automatically and indicated by
a special sensor value. However, the returned sensor value does not indicate which component,
i.e. the sensor or the motor, actually failed. This causes difficulty in performing effective error
recovery. Very often, despite a failure having been detected, it is not possible to determine from
the available sensor readings which of several possible failures has actually occurred. In such
circumstances the control program is designed simply to bring the system to a stop in a safe
state, so that off-line diagnosis can be performed.
For each (enclosing or nested) action, various exceptions are defined based on failure analysis
and an exception graph for resolving concurrent exceptions is defined. For example, the
LoadPress1 action may give rise to exceptions such as pr1_failure (press 1 failure),
b_sensor_failure (blank sensor failure), arm1_failure1 (blank lost), arm1_failure2
(cannot drop the blank), rs_m_failure (rotary sensor or motor failure), as_m_failure1 (arm
1 sensor or motor failure while the blank on arm 1), as_m_failure2 (arm 1 sensor or motor
failure while the blank in press 1), cs_failure (control software failure(s)), and rt_except
(run time exceptions such as overflow).
rs_m_failure & 
pr1_failure
other undefined
exceptions
universal exception
pr1_
failure
b_sensor
_failure
arm1_
failure1
rs_m_
failure
cs_
failure
rt_
except
arm1_
failure2
as_m_
failure1
as_m_
failure2
as_m_failure & 
b_sensor_failure
cs_failure & 
rt_except
Fig. 5: Exception Graph for CA Action LoadPress1
An exception graph for this action is shown in Figure 5, again assuming that no more than two
exceptions are raised concurrently. For example, if both press 1 and the robot rotation motor
fail simultaneously, this exception graph will be searched and the resolving exception
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rs_m_failure & pr1_failure will be raised instead of the individual  exceptions
rs_m_failure and pr1_failure, so that a suitable handler for this particular situation can be
invoked. Any undefined exception pairs will not be resolved and will simply lead to the raising
of the universal exception. (The handler for the universal exception is responsible for
stopping the system and leaving the production cell in a pre-defined safe state, if possible.)
4 .4 Design of Device-Controllers
Given a set of CA actions to control the interaction of devices in the production cell,
device/sensor-controllers are used to determine dynamically the order in which the CA actions
are executed. Eight controllers are designed: FeedBelt, Table, Robot, Press1, Press2,
DepositBelt, Supplier, and Consumer. Two queue objects are defined in order to improve
the flexibility of operations of both the robot and the deposit belt: robotQueue and
depositBeltQueue. The Press1 controller is shown below as a simple example:
Press1Controller:
loop forever {
robotQueue.put(PRESS1_FREE) -- put message in robotQueue
LoadPress1.Press(plate) -- activate action LoadPress1
ForgeBlank1.Press(plate) -- activate action ForgeBlank1
robotQueue.put(FORGED_PLATE_IN_PRESS1) -- put message in robotQueue
UnloadPress1.Press(plate) -- activate action UnloadPress1
}
Figure 6 shows the interactions between the controllers and CA actions, where boxes represent
CA actions and ovals represent controllers. A grey line indicates message passing between
controllers, while a black line connects an action to a controller or vice versa and implies that
the controller plays a role in that action.
LoadFeedBelt
LoadTable
UnloadTable
UnloadPress1
DepositBelt
Robot
TableFeedBelt
Supplier
LoadPress1 Press1
ForgeBlank1
UnloadPress2
LoadPress2
Press2
ForgeBlank2
LoadDepositBelt
TransportBeltUnloadDepositBeltConsumer
path of blank passing
path of message passing
Fig. 6: Interaction between Controllers and CA Actions
5 Formalization of CA Action-Based Designs
We had earlier developed a general scheme for formalizing CA action-based designs of finite
systems as state transition systems specifically for the purpose of checking system properties
such as liveness, safety and fault tolerance[Canver et al. 1998]. This general approach assumes
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that a set of controlling processes is defined together with a set of CA actions that are utilized
by the controllers, and enables the system behaviour to be formalized in terms of its operations
on the global objects in the system that are external to all CA actions.
The state transition system corresponding to a CA action based design is characterized by its
(global) state-space, a set of initial states and a next-state relation. The global state-space is
composed from the global objects and the state-spaces of the CA actions, representing the kind
of outcome – normal or exceptional – produced by each CA action and encoding whether its
roles are idle or activated. The initial states are supposed to satisfy two kinds of properties: i)
any application specific requirements that need to be considered, and ii) the requirement that
initially all roles should be idle and no exception should have been signalled.
The next-state relation defines the computation paths that are possible in the system. This
essentially corresponds to four kinds of activities that may occur in the system: i) a controlling
process may call and thus invoke a role from a CA action, thereby activating it, ii) if all roles of
a CA action have been activated, the CA action may be executed according to its interface
specification given in terms of pre- and post-conditions for both normal and exceptional
outcomes, iii) after a CA action has been executed, a return is issued from its roles to the
corresponding controlling processes that called them, and iv) a controlling process may execute
an (internal) action in which no CA action is involved.
Due to the atomicity of CA actions and since internal actions of controlling processes are
independent from each other, it is sufficient to view only interleaving occurrences of state
transitions. Thus we have modelled the next-state relation to encode the interleaving
semantics. The state transition system obtained from a CA action-based design of a finite
system can be used to analyze its properties by model-checking. We have found SMV
[McMillan 1993] particularly useful for this purpose: the state-transition system can be
expressed in SMV and the properties of the system to be analysed can be expressed in CTL
[Emerson 1990]. The technical details of representing a CA action-based design in SMV and
the properties of a system in CTL were described in [Canver et al. 1998]; in the following we
will illustrate this formalization and the formal analysis of its properties using representative
parts of our Fault-Tolerant Production Cell design.
The CA actions that control the production cell are described according to their interfaces which
consist of the set of roles they provide, the external objects they access (as expressed by the
parameters of the roles), and their pre- and post-conditions. They are formalized, using SMV
derived from our COALA design, according to the general scheme outlined above, which is
exemplified here for the LoadPress1 action. (We use An and Sn to represent Actuator n and
Sensor n.)
MODULE LoadPress1(...)
  DEFINE
    pre := A6 = stop & A7 = stop & A10 = stop &   -- robot off
           A8 = on &                              -- blank on arm 1
           S15 = pos_ret & S16 = pos_ret &        -- arms retracted
           (S17 = R2 | S17 = R5) &                -- robot rotation
           A4 = stop &                            -- press1 off
           (!S21 -> !S7) &                        -- no blank in press1
           S8 & !S9 & !S10;                       -- press1 at lower position
    enabled :=   roleRobot = activated & rolePress1 = activated & pre;
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    mv_cond :=   enabled & next(signal) in { normal, ... };
    drop_cond := enabled & next(signal) in { lost_blank };
  VAR
    roleRobot : { nonactive, activated, returning };
    rolePress1: ...
    signal :    { normal, press1_failure, lost_blank, ... };
    mvblank :   MoveBlank(mv_cond, drop_cond, blank_on_arm1, blank_in_press1);
  ASSIGN
    init(roleRobot) := nonactive;
    next(roleRobot) := case
                         enabled : returning;
                         1 : state;
                       esac;
    ...
    init(signal) := normal;
    next(signal) := case
                    enabled:    { normal, press1_failure, ... };
                    OTHERWISE:  signal;
                    esac;
    ...
    next(A8) :=     case
                    enabled & next(signal) = normal:         off;
                    enabled & next(signal) = press1_failure: on;
                    ... { values for other exceptional post-conditions }
                    OTHERWISE: A8;
                    esac;
    ...
The SMV module of the CA action is parameterized with the external objects that it can access.
The pre part defines the precondition for the CA action; the CA action is enabled when all of its
roles are activated and the precondition is true. The roles are represented by their states (being
nonactive, activated, or returning). Initially, roles are nonactive. When the CA action is
enabled, it may be executed and in this case the role changes its state to returning. The main
participants in this particular CA action are the controllers of press 1 and the robot. Thus,
LoadPress1 provides roles for both of them.
The signal variable represents the exception that is signalled by the CA action LoadPress1. It
is initialized to normal, encoding to indicate that no exception has been signalled. When the
CA action is executed then any of the normal or exceptional outcomes is possible; this is
expressed with the nondeterministic choice in the next-state assignment for the signal
variable.
The next-state assignments for the external objects are obtained from the post-condition of
the CA action LoadPress1:
  post_normal == ... & A8 = off & ...         -- no blank on arm 1
  post_press1_failure == ... & A8 = on  & ... -- blank on arm 1
  ...
  post == (signal = normal & post_normal)
  or (signal = press1_failure & post_press1_failure)
  or ...                                      -- other except. outcomes
The SMV formalisation of LoadPress1 illustrates this for actuator A8 (i.e. arm 1’s magnet).
When the CA action is executed, then in normal conditions and also in certain exceptional
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conditions a blank is moved from arm 1 to press 1. This is expressed with the condition
mv_cond and the corresponding instance of the SMV-module MoveBlank which encodes in
SMV the actions for moving the blank; for details see [Canver et al. 1998].
The pre- and post-conditions of the CA actions are designed to be compatible with the intended
ordering on the execution of the CA actions: after a CA action is executed, the pre-condition of
the next appropriate CA action should be satisfied. Activating the next appropriate CA action is
the main task of the device-controllers. The activation of a CA action is performed by calling its
roles. Calling a role consists of two parts: invoking the role and finishing the call on
termination of the CA action. The formalisation of controllers in SMV is exemplified below
using the Press1Controller:
MODULE Press1Controller(loadpress1, forgeblank1, unloadpress1)
  DEFINE
    continue :=   loadpress1.signal = b_sensor_failure  -- blank sensor failure
                | loadpress1.signal = normal;           -- no failure
    at_load  :=   !blank_in_press1.present
                & forgeblank1.Press1.nonactive & unloadpress1.Press1.nonactive
                & continue;
    at_forge :=   blank_in_press1.present & blank_in_press1.state = plain
                & loadpress1.Press1.nonactive & unloadpress1.Press1.nonactive
                & continue;
    at_unload:=  blank_in_press1.present & blank_in_press1.state = forged
                & loadpress1.Press1.nonactive & forgeblank1.Press1.nonactive
                & continue;
  VAR
    A4 :          { up, down, stop };     -- A4: move press1
    S7 :          boolean;                -- S7: blank in press1
    S8 :          boolean;                -- S8: in lower position
    S9 :          boolean;                -- S9: in middle position
    S10 :         boolean;                -- S10: in upper position
    blank_in_press1 :    Blank(void);
  ASSIGN
    init(S7) := 0;
    init(S8) := 1;
    init(S9) := 0;
    init(S10):= 0;
    init(A4) := stop;
    next(loadpress1.rolePress1) :=
             case
               loadpress1.rolePress1 = nonactive
               & at_load :                         activated;
               loadpress1.rolePress1 = returning : nonactive;
               OTHERWISE :                         loadpress1.rolePress1;
             esac;
    next(forgepress1.rolePress1) := ...
    next(unloadpress1.rolePress1):= ...
This controller process has access to CA actions LoadPress1 , ForgeBlank1 , and
UnloadPress1. It iterates calling its roles in these CA actions. For example it activates its role
in CA action LoadPress1 if at_load is true and the role is not yet activated. When the role is
in the returning state, the call is finished by setting its state to nonactive. The roles of press 1 in
the other CA actions are treated similarly. The actuators and sensors are modelled as objects of
(the controllers of) the devices and must be initialized appropriately.
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Blanks are the main objects of interest in the Production Cell case study as far as the
application’s functionality is concerned; they are passed on from one device to the next. The
blank currently being held by a device is represented in the corresponding controlling process
by a variable that models blanks as records of two entries: a name for identifying the blank and
a component expressing whether a blank has already been forged:
MODULE Blank(name)
  DEFINE
    present := !(id = void);
  VAR
    id :        { void, anon, id1 };
    state :     { plain, forged };
  ASSIGN
    init(id)   := name;
    init(state):= plain;
Initially a blank is not forged (i.e. is plain). The name component id is assigned value void if
there is currently no blank at the position represented by the variable, id1 if a blank with name
id1 is present at the position represented by the variable, and anon if a blank with a name
different from id1 is present at the position represented by the variable. The instances defined
for the controllers are all initialized with void indicating that initially no device holds a blank.
An unlimited supply of identifiers would be necessary for observing each blank individually.
The distinction between id1 and anon is made so as to observe a specific blank named id1 on
its way through the cell. This is done in order to abstract from a non-finite system to a finite
state representation; it is sufficient to formalize the requirements for the system in this way
since each requirement needs at most one blank to be identified. Our formalisation is such that
at any time there is at most one blank named id1 in the system.
The other CA actions and controllers of the production cell were encoded in SMV analogously;
the combination of all the actions and the controllers provides the state transition system that
was used for checking the properties of the Production Cell.
6 Formalizing Properties of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell
We have formalized and model-checked a significant proportion of the safety, liveness, and
fault-tolerance requirements for the Production Cell II case study. The properties are expressed
in terms of CTL formulae over the transition system for the CA action-based design formalized
in SMV. CTL allows  several temporal modalities to be used for expressing properties over the
behaviour of a system; we have mainly used the AG  (“henceforth”) operator for expressing
properties that are to hold in all reachable states and the AF (“eventually”) operator for
expressing properties that are expected to eventually hold in some reachable state.
We are mainly concerned with fault-tolerance requirements which express properties over the
behaviour of a system despite the occurrence of a failure. These may include safety and
liveness properties. If tolerable is a formula describing states where there are no faults, or
only those faults that are supposed to be tolerated by the system, and if P expresses some
desired property, then formula
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  AG (tolerable -> P)
expresses that along each execution path property P is valid if and faults that occur are tolerable
ones, i.e. P is treated as a (conditional) safety property. Similarly for liveness: the formula
  AF (tolerable -> P)
expresses that along each execution path either a state satisfying P will be reached or a non-
tolerable fault will occur. This means that P will eventually become true along each path where
at most tolerable faults occur, i.e. P is treated as a (conditional) liveness property.
If we set tolerable equal to true then we express that any (modelled) failure should be
tolerable. In this case the conditional safety and liveness properties reduce to the non-
conditional forms AG  P and AF P. Properties that are only expected to hold in the case that no
fault occurs now need to be written in the conditional form where formula tolerable
characterises the fault-free cases.
We will now illustrate this scheme for formalizing properties with the main fault-tolerance
requirement, i.e. the “continuous service requirement” which states that the system will
continue to operate in a degraded manner, even if one of the presses (here press 1) fails.
Failures of press 1 are signalled by the CA action LoadPress1 with the exceptions
press1_failure or b_sensor_failure. The property encoding the continuous service
requirement should express that if, during execution of the cell, a press1_failure or a
b_sensor_failure occurs, then any blank in other devices of the Production Cell or blanks
inserted afterwards will be processed and arrive on the deposit belt unless another failure
occurs later. This is formalised here for a blank with name id1 on the feed belt:
“If a press1 related failure occurs ...”
AG (loadpress1.signal in { press1_failure, b_sensor_failure } ->
“... then a blank (named id1) on the feed belt ...”
AG (blank_on_feed_belt.id = id1 ->
“... will eventually, if only tolerable failures occur, ...”
AF ((loadpress1.signal in { normal, press1_failure, b_sensor_failure })
“... arrive on the deposit belt”
    -> blank_on_end_deposit_belt.id = id1)))
7 Design for Validation
The analysis of properties of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell was carried out in parallel with
the development of its CA action based design. Model-checking helped us to find several flaws
in early versions of the design. By analyzing the causes for failed proofs of the required
properties, we have been able to derive corresponding solutions. This shows the usefulness of
model-checking for developing and improving the CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant
Production Cell. The flaws we found affected both the fault tolerance and the coordination
aspects of the CA action-design of the cell. The results from the formal analysis have directly
contributed to refining and improving our design.
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To take just one example, we identified a problem that affected the order in which the robot
interacts with the devices around it. The problem does not occur in the single blank instance of
our model and thus it is hard to detect by just reviewing the specification text. If two blanks are
in the system then the robot could manoeuvre itself into a situation from which no further
activities were possible. Such “critical” sequences of actions can be derived from counter-
example paths generated by the model-checker. The counter-example also helps in finding
solutions to the detected problem: we dealt with this particular problem by enabling the
occurrence of the next appropriate actions after such critical sequences. This was done by
appropriately weakening the preconditions of the actions to be executed next (see also the
related discussion in Section 4.1).
8 An Implementation
We have implemented the design of the control program that was discussed in the previous
sections using a Java implementation of a distributed CA action support scheme [Xu et al.
1998b]. (This scheme makes use of the nested multi-threaded transaction facilities provided by
the Arjuna transaction support system [Parrington et al. 1995].)
Fig. 7: The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell Simulator
Figure 7 shows a screen dump of the FZI Fault-Tolerant Production Cell simulator controlled
by our implementation. Outlines of 12 top-level CA actions are displayed on the simulator
diagram. During system execution these outlines are coloured in gradually to show the progress
of a CA action execution dynamically. In the figure, there are three CA actions that are active
and being executed: LoadTable, LoadPress1, and ForgeBlank2. If an exception, or two
concurrent exceptions, are raised in an action, the colour within the outline will change to
indicate the dynamic process of exception handling.
Figure 8 shows a slightly modified version of the device and sensor failure injection panel
provided by FZI. Using this failures can be easily injected into the Production Cell simulator.
For example, a rotary motor failure or a rotary sensor failure of the robot can be injected by
pressing the corresponding buttons in the panel. We have extended the original FZI panel to
permit the injection of concurrent failures: a pair of failures can be injected into the simulator if
the failure mode selection is set to “double”. In this mode, two different failure buttons may be
pressed sequentially, but only the second press will stimulate the actual injection of the two
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concurrent failures. After one or more failures are injected into the simulator, the error detection
measures embedded in our control program should be able to detect them promptly. One or
more corresponding exceptions will thus be raised. The simulator will then portray how such
exceptions are handled within the CA action framework, in particular how the system is, if
necessary, brought to a stop in a safe state.
Fig. 8: Revised Failure Injection Panel
During the testing phase and the demonstration of our implementation, all injected device or
sensor failures were caught successfully and handled immediately by our control program.
Even a previously unknown software bug in the original FZI simulator was also detected by the
acceptance test of a CA action and recovered by the retry operation associated with the action.
We are now in the stage of collecting experimental data for further dependability and
performance-related evaluation.
9 Conclusions
Unlike the first Production Cell model, in the “Fault-Tolerant Production Cell” failures of
electro-mechanical components are of major concern. This requires a control program that is
much more complex than the program developed for the original cell, though it follows the
same general strategy, i.e. using CA actions where there are safety-critical interactions
involving multiple moving mechanical components. In order to develop the required control
program, we have conducted an analysis of possible component failures and identified the
various ways of detecting these failures. We have used the results of this analysis to guide the
design of a system employing what is in fact a very sophisticated exception handling scheme,
capable of dealing appropriately even with concurrent occurrences of any of the wide variety of
possible failures defined in the FZI specification of Production Cell II.
As a result of the experience we have gained during the process of formalizing and designing
this control software, we feel that we now have a much fuller understanding of CA actions and
the design issues involved in their implementation. It was very pleasing to confirm that the
much more complex requirements of Production Cell II could be satisfied by what was in fact a
straightforward though very large extension of the approach we had used in Production Cell I
[Zorzo et al. 1998]. This again enabled all the dependability (and especially the safety) related
aspects of the problem to be solved very directly using just the CA action mechanism, despite
the need to add very extensive exception handling strategies. It was also pleasing to confirm
that the CA action structuring greatly aided not just the design but also the validation of the
control program, in this case by means of model-checking.
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In light of the fact that the original Production Cell was the subject of extensive studies using
various formal approaches, we should emphasize that to the best of our knowledge our work
represents the first and so far only complete formal analysis and validation of a design for the
much more complex and realistic Production Cell II. [Matos & White 1998] describe a system
design for Production Cell II that focuses just on a dynamic and transparent reconfiguration
scheme that preserves safety properties. Our design is essentially different, and focuses mainly
on co-operation between devices during both normal execution and the process of exception
handling; safety-related requirements are addressed by both proper synchronization inside CA
actions and necessary mutual exclusion of the action execution whenever the concurrent
execution of two CA actions is unsafe. [Liggesmeyer & Rothfelder 1998] developed a Formal
Risk Analysis approach for analyzing the run-time behaviour of Production Cell II, and studied
how various sensor and actuator faults could affect both system reliability and safety.
However, their analysis is not complete, and only uses the elevating rotary table of the
Production Cell as an example. In contrast, our analysis is much more comprehensive and
complete, including the classification of various failures and the identification of possible
failures related to every device in the cell (for the complete treatment, see [Xu et al. 1998b]).
Production Cells I and II do not involve any consideration of timing deadlines. We have
extended our ideas on exception handling and resolution to deal with such complications as
possibly concurrent timing and value faults [Romanovsky et al. 1998] — these being situations
that can arise in Production Cell III, the “Real-Time Production Cell” model [Lötzbeyer &
Mühlfeld 1996], a control program for which is now being developed.
The design style we have been using was one that we arrived at through very specific
consideration of the problems raised by the Production Cell examples. We now realize that a
more methodical and general means of arriving at the design of CA action-based programs is
possible, as well as being highly desirable [DeLemos & Romanovsky 1997]. Ideally, of
course, such an approach would be allied to a formal means of validating the system design as
it is developed — something that could we believe take advantage of the formal treatment of CA
actions, as shown in this paper and [Schwier et al. 1997][Canver et al. 1998], and the formal
language for specifying CA actions, COALA [Vachon et al. 1998].
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